Introduction
During her speech at the Center for Global Development, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde warned on a triple crisis -Economic, Environment, Social -and announced IMF research support on the use of fiscal tools in climate policies (e.g. De Mooij et al. 2012) . This warning signals a clear recognition of a close linkage between macro and environmental outcomes within an institution which traditionally targeted economic performance in a narrow sense. Moreover, many observers outlined the link between lower deforestation rates and the financial crisis, which dried up credit flows towards activities fueling deforestation: for example, Nepstad et al. (2009) did not exclude that the [2008] [2009] financial crisis had something to do with an impressive decrease in deforestation rates in the Amazonian region. This proposition makes reminiscent earlier debates between those arguing that economic growth is detrimental to the environment (e.g. Meadows et al. 2005) and those promoting economic growth as a mean to alleviate the pressure on the environment (e.g. Beckerman 1992 ). The objective of this paper is precisely to build on this link between macroeconomics and the environment; namely, it focuses on the channel through which macroeconomics may alter environmental quality.
Several authors addressed the relationship between macroeconomic performances and environmental issues. Significant contributions include the pioneer work of Grossman & Krueger (1995) , showing the existence of an "environmental Kuznets curve" (EKC), and the study of the relation binding economic growth and the environment (see, for example, Bovenberg & Smulders 1995 or more recently Fullerton & Kim 2008 . As regards deforestation, several authors paid attention to the role of macroeconomic factors in the process of deforestation, in the wake of the economic reforms implemented under structural adjustment programs in the 1990s. For instance, Angelsen & Kaimowitz (1999) found that adjustment programs may increase the pressure on forests, a view supported by other studies focusing on debt and deforestation (Culas 2006) . Trade liberalization affects deforestation in a more ambiguous way, through movements in prices of agricultural outputs and inputs as well as timber prices (Robalino & Herrera 2010) , while relative prices, measured by real exchange rates, were shown to determine deforestation dynamics (Arcand et al. 2008) .
In this paper we explore the link between macroeconomic performances and environmental issues by explicitly modeling a tradeoff between economic and environmental performances.
More precisely, in the wider environment-development dilemma (see e.g. Combes Motel et al. 2013 ) context, we analyze a possible tradeoff between inflation-fighting policies and deforestation, through the government budget constraint. Our starting point is that the majority of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, having limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets. This is consistent with recent studies on tax revenues in developing compared to developed ones: in highincome countries over the 1994-2009 period, tax revenues represent a larger fraction of GDP and have increased faster than in middle-income and poor countries (Le et al. 2012) . 1 This fact is explained either by differences in preferences towards public versus private goods or as deficient tax collection systems (Gordon & Li 2009 ). Consequently, developing countries can be incited to draw on two sources of government financing, namely resource harvesting and seigniorage revenues.
We pay special attention to "deforestation revenues" accruing to governments, namely revenues generated by timber harvesting as well as revenues from land-use change activities, i.e. government revenues resulting from encroachments of agriculture and cities on forested areas. Indeed, the outcome of deforestation can represent an important source of government revenues; this is all the more true in developing economies, where forest is cleared for agriculture, forestry or commercial purposes, and there can be a pressure for developing its exploitation or for converting it for obtaining "deforestation revenues". They are meant to cover revenues generated by timber harvesting as well as by land-use changes, i.e. from forested areas converted to agricultural areas (crop revenues and livestock), and to a lesser extent revenues from urban areas. In other words, "deforestation revenues" are closely linked to drivers of deforestation as described by several authors, among which Chomitz (2007) or Geist & Lambin (2001) , who have put emphasis on their diversity. It is worth noticing that the last Forest Resource Assessment issued in 2010 by the FAO provides estimates of "forest revenues" defined as "all government revenue[s] collected from the domestic production and trade of forest products and services" (FAO 2010) . They amount to 14.6 billion USD in 2005 and widely underestimate all "deforestation revenues", i.e. revenues generated by deforestation activities. We argue here that the most appropriate way to seize "deforestation revenues" is to consider rates of deforestation.
1 Tax revenues as a fraction of GDP equal 21.2%, 18.8% and 11.3% in respectively high-income, middle-income and poor countries in 1994, while in 2009 figures are 29.3, 19.3 and 13.6 respectively (Le et al. 2012 ).
Deforestation activities have negative effects on the environment. For instance, forests are the second biggest stock of carbon after Oceans, 2 therefore contributing to mitigating climate change. They provide a habitat for a wide range of known and unknown species over the planet, which can be potentially driven by human encroachments to an extinction (Laurance et al. 2012) . Moreover, land use changes, which are mainly the result of deforestation, are responsible for about 25% anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Denman et al. 2007 ). Houghton (2005) estimates that the magnitude of carbon released by tropical deforestation is about 15 to 35% of annual fossil fuel emissions during the 1990s, and Van der Werf et al. (2009) conclude that forest losses are substantial contributors to GHG emissions into the atmosphere.
At last, forests contribute to the water cycle: the Amazon basin accounts for one fifth of total freshwater drained into oceans. Data show that deforestation occurs at a yearly pace of about than 7 million hectares per year between 1990 and 2010 ( (% of GDP, 1990 -2010 ) 1990 -2010 Nb 1990 -1995 Nb 1996 -1999 Nb The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple theoretical model that establishes the existence of an optimal (welfare-maximizing) tradeoff between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. In particular, the higher the pressure on lowering inflation (for example, through inflation targeting), the higher the deforestation. 
According to (1) Barro (1990) , in which productive public spending exerts a positive influence on long-run economic growth, but must be financed by taxes, which crowd out private investment. In such a case, the tradeoff between the productive effect of public expenditures and the crowing out effect of taxes results in an optimal target for g .
Third, to account for the evidence in the introduction, emphasizing the growing interest of "sustainable development" in both peoples' conscience and politics' concerns, we consider an environmental objective in the welfare function. Namely, in countries endowed with natural resources, citizens may be interested in preserving the resource, by defending a targeted rate of deforestation ( ) A single Monetary and Fiscal Authority (the "Government") finances public spending by the means of deforestation revenues and from seigniorage (the presence of a single authority may be compatible with the fact that seigniorage revenues are available at no transfer cost, for example). We assume Laffer-efficiency of the seigniorage collection, namely seigniorage is positively related to inflation (we stick to the increasing part of the seigniorage Laffer curve).
Moreover, we assume that deforestation revenues are positively related to deforestation. The government budget constraint is
where e E π π = is the (rational) expected inflation rate.
The last term of (2) accounts for the possibility of time inconsistency of monetary policy; such time inconsistency justifies the inflation target we introduce below. We assume that time inconsistency of monetary policy comes from the government budget constraint; 4 if, for example, government can benefit from surprises on seigniorage, because the demand for money depends on the nominal interest rate, thus on expected inflation (Cagan 1956 ). 3 The target π summarizes the well-know tradeoff between the social costs and benefits of inflation, but could also arise from a non-linear effect of inflation on growth:
, , f R g γ π
, without any change in (1).
Effectively, unexpected inflation reduces the nominal interest rate and induces households to demand more real balances, which allows the government to issue more money in real terms.
5 Calvo (1978) and Barro & Gordon (1983) , among others, have shown that this "inflationary finance" can provide a valuable way of government finance if alternative methods of raising revenue (such as an income tax) entail distortions. 
2.2/ The environmental-disinflation tradeoff
As a benchmark, let us present the commitment solution of the game, in which the government maximizes the welfare ( )
and internalizes the effect of the inflation rate on expectations, so that public expenditures are simply: απ
. First-order conditions on inflation and deforestation revenues ( ( )
give rise to:
, respectively. Using these two relations, 5 Suppose that the Government budget constraint is the following: 
. We approximate the rate of seigniorage by the rate of inflation ( ) (2)), and by neglecting the constant term r ϕ .
6 The temptation to generate inflation surprises relates to governmental liabilities that are fixed in nominal terms, rather than to money per se. Thus, the same argument may apply to nominally-denominated interest-bearing public debt: unexpected inflation is a source of government revenue if it reduces the real value of the debt burden (because the nominal interest rate on debt depends on expected inflation). However, this source of revenue is limited in developing and emerging countries, because public debt is most often denominated in foreign currency, thus immunized to domestic inflation surprises. Similarly, seigniorage revenues from unexpected inflation are unlikely to arise in dollarized economies. In those economies, we would have 0 
( )
where
In light of the so-called "Tinbergen rule", the problem may be considered as a Mundelllike "triangle of impossibility", between economic development (i.e. the goal linked to the public spending target), environmental goals and inflation, meaning that the first-best ( policy gives the government incentives to cheat, as described in the following by the discretionary regime of the game.
In the discretionary regime, there is an inflation bias since the government attempts to generate seigniorage revenues by producing "inflation surprises", while in equilibrium such surprises are inconsistent with the rational behavior of citizens. To reproduce the commitment solution, several strategies to the problem of time-inconsistency were discussed in the literature, all of them distorting the government welfare function. Rogoff (1985) suggests appointing a "conservative" central banker (namely, who puts more emphasis than citizens on inflation deviations), while Walsh (1995) defends "contractual solutions".
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In this paper we implement a third solution, namely inflation targeting (which in our setup is however formally equivalent to the contractual approach of Walsh : Svensson 1997) , and suppose that citizens impose an inflation target π to the government, who maximizes
The inflation target should be less than the "social" target ( ) π , to remove the inflation bias of monetary policy (this will be the case of the "optimal" target, as we see below), but here a general formulation, without constraining the range of values for πˆ, is adopted.
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In the discretionary regime with inflation targeting, the government maximizes (4) and we find the optimal inflation and deforestation values using first-order conditions:
The equilibrium values for inflation and deforestation are now
( ) Equations (5a)- (5b) show that a tighter monetary policy (a lower inflation target πˆ) decreases the discretionary inflation rate (
Consequently, we find a tradeoff between inflation and the environment: monetary policies that aim at reducing inflation are found to worsen environmental quality, by increasing deforestation rates. Notice that this tradeoff does not depend on the number of instruments available for government finance. Effectively, whatever the instruments to finance public expenditure, the optimal situation (which excludes corner solutions) will be to use slightly all available instruments. Therefore, reducing seigniorage will result in increasing the use of all instruments, including deforestation (see Appendix A1 for a generalization of our model).
Empirical evidence on the substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation
Our theoretical model exhibits a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation.
This section tests this finding on a panel of developing countries. We first outline the econometric model and the data, before presenting the results.
3.1/ The basic econometric specification and the data
We estimate a dynamic panel data model with country and time fixed effects The left-hand side variable is the average deforestation rate over the considered period (Defor). Data come from FAOSTAT, who compiles forest stocks between 1990 and 2010.
Our interest variable is the seigniorage, computed as the change in reserve money over GDP for the considered period (Aisen & Veiga 2008) . We consider the average variation in reserves over GDP (Seigniorage1) and, alternatively and to account for extreme values, the median value of variations in reserves over GDP (Seigniorage2).
We account for two groups of control variables k X , namely close to the theoretical model (first group), and inspired by the related literature (second group). In the first group, to account for the fact that an increase in public spending is detrimental to the forest (public spending raises the need for additional resources), we introduce two variables, namely the ratio of general government consumption to GDP (GovSpend), and the ratio of the total debt service to exports (DebtBurden). Appendix A2 presents variables' definitions and sources. Rudel & Roper (1997) describe a resource-consuming economic growth process, which may be compensated by reallocation effects between agricultural and industrialized sector.
Therefore, we do not sign a priori the effect of Growth on deforestation. Fourth, following Bhattarai & Hammig (2001) , to account for the fact that better institutions preserve forests, we rely on two measures of the quality of institutions, namely the government stability (Govstab) and internal conflict (IntConf) as measured by the PRS group through the ICRG (Ferreira & Vincent 2010) . In both cases, an increase signals an improvement and is expected to reduce deforestation. Fifth, we consider the real exchange rate (Reer) to control for the competitiveness of the export sector.
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In line with previous findings (Arcand et al. 2008 ), a real appreciation of the local currency (an increase in Reer) is expected to reduce deforestation. The intuition is that it slows down land clearing for the agricultural export sector expansion and penalizes the profitability of logging activities for exports. Sixth, the instability of the real exchange rate (ReerInst) captures the potential macroeconomic instability in developing countries; thus, we expect a negative effect. Finally, we also take the real interest rate (IntRate) into account to capture the Hotelling rule, i.e. a decrease in the real interest rate dampens forest depletion; nevertheless, this effect could be contradicted since the interest rate also affects the user cost of capital in deforestation activities (Farzin 1984) .
However, since deforestation activities are deemed to be labor-intensive, the former effect is potentially more important; this intuition is not rejected in the empirical literature dedicated to the drivers of timber harvests (Ferreira & Vincent 2010) . In particular, monetary policy is considered not to impact real interest rates, from the perspective of the neutrality of money in the long-run and the privileged influence of the international environment (i.e. international real interest rates) on domestic real interest rates.
For each of the 79 countries to be potentially included in the sample (Appendix A3 presents the list of countries), four observations are available for the following periods: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2010 ; period-averages are computed to hinder short-term fluctuations.
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The Arellano and Bond's GMM estimator for dynamic panel is implemented for two reasons (Arellano & Bond 1991) . First, the OLS estimator is inconsistent since the lagged dependent variable is introduced besides country fixed-effects (Nickell 1981) . Second, the GMM estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of the Seigniorage variables due to measurement error, reverse causality or omission of pertinent variable. The equations are estimated in first-differences and the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are used as 10 Note that Reer is computed without taking into account oil exporters in the calculation of the weighting of the main trade partners. We report that introducing oil exporters does not change our results.
11 The lower bound time period for our sample can be subject to debate, as FAO Production Yearbook data on deforestation are available since 1970. Considering the time span 1970-2005, we were exhibiting in the previous version of our manuscript a significant and robust substitution effect on deforestation and seigniorage. However, this series is less reliable than the estimates of deforestation from FAOSTAT, which rely on the recent Forest Resource Assessment (FRA 2010) . To make our analysis more convincing, we draw upon FAOSTAT data which are available for the period 1990-2010. Although these estimates span just 20 years, they are the best available cross-country data on deforestation. We restrict to FAO Production Yearbook data only for providing instruments of the lagged endogenous variable.
instruments.
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The validity of the instruments is tested by the Sargan/Hansen overidentification test and by the second order serial correlation test AR(2), where the null hypothesis is that the error term does not exhibit auto-correlation. At last, to deal with the problem of instruments proliferation, the matrix of instruments is collapsed to ensure that the number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries (Roodman 2009 ). 12 The lagged deforestation rate and the seigniorage are considered as predetermined and the other variables as strictly exogenous.
3.2/ The econometric results

Equations [1] and [1bis] in
Regarding control variables, the positive and significant coefficient of one-period lagged deforestation does not reject the existence of an inertia phenomenon in deforestation process.
Moreover, the presence of an EKC is supported in most cases. When significant, population increases deforestation, as expected.
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Even more importantly, in several specifications public spending and the debt service have a positive effect on deforestation, which may be consistent with the conclusions of Kahn & McDonald (1995) , defending debt alleviations as a mean to reduce the pressure on forests (although "environmental debt alleviations" are of low magnitude Most importantly, when accounting for all these crucial determinants of deforestation, we can clearly isolate a negative and significant link between seigniorage and deforestation. In addition to its persistence in both sign and significance when progressively adding up determinants of deforestation, this effect remains robust for different measures of seigniorage (average or median values) or when adding to the internal instruments inherent to the GMM method an external instrument, namely the central bank governors' turnover. Consequently, our estimations emphasize a statistically significant tradeoff between seigniorage and deforestation, as predicted by our theoretical analysis.
In addition to its negative sign, it may be worth providing an estimation of the magnitude of this negative effect. On the basis of equation [1] , the avoided deforestation rate generated by a one standard deviation increase in seigniorage reaches approximately one tenth of the annual average deforestation rate over 1990 to 2010. This result confirms that the environmental sacrifice ratio of inflation-fighting policies is not negligible, and that there exists a tradeoff between macroeconomic goals and environmental objectives, as depicted by Figure 1 , which needs to be further addressed.
Solving the environmental versus disinflation tradeoff
This tradeoff can be very unpleasant both from LDCs and worldwide perspectives. On the one hand, low inflation is often necessary for economic stability and inflation-fighting policies are often considered as a prerequisite to obtain international aid: are LDCs condemned to pay inflation cuts with natural resources damages? On the other hand, deforestation exerts international spillover effects. Thus, inflation-fighting policies conducted in LDC can have harmful effects from a worldwide welfare perspective. In this section, we search for an institutional setup that can avoid making such a choice between low-inflation and environmental policies.
To address this question, suppose that, in the theoretical model of section 2, the commitment equilibrium (which can be replicated by the optimal inflation target in the discretionary regime) is optimal from the domestic citizens' perspective, but, because of international spillovers, is not optimal from the Rest-of-the-World point of view. We can assume, for example, that the deforestation rate d R is too high relative to global environmental objectives on a worldwide scale. Thus, we search for a solution in the form of a transfer scheme that could be implemented by an International Agency, which acts as a (worldwide) social planner. Acting as the "Principal", the International Agency can deliver a contract to domestic government (the "Agent"), in order to reduce deforestation. To achieve this goal, the Principal transfers to the Agent a basic allowance F , which is reduced by an amount proportional to resource depletion. Thus, the financial transfer is F R ω − , where ω is the penalty per unit of deforestation.
14 Consequently, the government maximizes the following welfare function, with πˆ the government's inflation target
We find the optimal inflation and deforestation values using the first-order conditions:
. The new equilibrium values under the discretionary regime are easily derived
As expected, resource harvesting ( ) ω R negatively depends on the penalty ω in relation (8b); moreover, notice that the "environmental penalty" positively affects the equilibrium inflation rate in relation (8a). As a result, the rate of inflation under the contractual regime will be higher than under the domestic discretionary regime: ( ) ( ) 
namely, after some simple algebra
Since 1 We are now able to compute the effect of π on the optimal rate of deforestation
The system (12a-b) presents a very interesting result. Contrary to the case 0 = ω in section 2, where a tighter monetary target was increasing deforestation, a lower inflation target ˆ0 dπ < reduces deforestation in relation (12b), or at least leaves it unchanged provided there is no time inconsistency ( ( )
The intuitive explanation of this result is the following. In relation (8b), a tighter inflation target reduces seigniorage and induces the Government to increase deforestation revenues (negative direct effect). To circumvent this incentive, the penalty on deforestation must be increased, thus reducing the equilibrium rate of deforestation (positive indirect effect). The net effect of the inflation target on deforestation is the sum of these direct and indirect effects.
Without time-inconsistency of monetary policy, there is no inflation bias, and the penalty on deforestation must be increased in order to exactly offset the effect of the inflation target, which leaves unchanged deforestation in equilibrium. In fact, without time inconsistency, the optimal inflation target should be equal to the "social" target ( ) With time-inconsistency, on the contrary, the commitment solution can no longer be reached, and, as we have seen, there is an incentive to cheat. Thus, following a cut in the inflation target, the optimal penalty must be specified in order to solve both the problem of the incentive to rely too heavily on deforestation revenues (for public finance needs) and the problem of the incentive to cheat (because of time-inconsistency), as depicted by the additional (third) term in the optimal penalty (11). This additional term ensures that the indirect effect of the penalty will exceed the direct effect of the inflation target in equation (8b). Therefore, the net effect of the inflation target on deforestation becomes positive, namely, a reduction of the inflation target gives rise to a reduction in deforestation.
Consequently, subsidizing efforts in strengthening the quality of environment may upturn the positive association between a tighter monetary policy and deforestation. In other words, under the "optimal penalty" ( ) * ω , the conflict between disinflation and environment vanishes; in some sense, the environmental transfer scheme is able to overcome the "triangle of impossibility" depicted in Figure 1 .
Remark that this institutional design, involving the interference of an International Agency that implements a transfer scheme to limit natural resource exploitation, is closely related to several advances about the implementation of "rewards" for countries combating the climate change, namely the design of policy devices and the estimation of GHG abatement costs related to forests.
On the one hand, Kahn & McDonald (1995) outline a significant positive association between public debt and deforestation in LDCs, and defend debt alleviations as a mean to reduce the pressure to deforest. Several countries, like Indonesia, have recently engaged in "debt-for-nature" swaps for preventing future deforestation. On the other hand, the Stern Review argued that the cost of reducing emissions from deforestation may be relatively low: the opportunity cost of ceasing deforestation ranges between 5 and 10 billion USD per year (Stern 2007, chap.9 ). More recently, it has been 16 Debt-for-nature swaps have been used as a tool for preserving environmental quality. They can take many different forms (Hansen 1989) and are designed to cutting-off foreign debt against an engagement to preserve the environment.
17 REDD programs are aimed at generating transfer flows of resources to reduce global emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (see, for example, Combes Motel et al. 2009 ). The REDD scheme recommends that developed countries pay developing countries for CO2 emissions saved through avoided deforestation. In Copenhagen an updated version of REDD was put forward, called REDD+ (Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation "plus" Conservation). Even closer to our proposition, a multi-donor trust fund was established in July 2008, allowing donors to pool resources and providing funding to activities towards this Program.
established that the majority of GHG abatement opportunities are located in developing countries, which are endowed with the highest opportunities in the forestry and agricultural sectors (Nauclér & Enkvist 2009 ).
Conclusion
In the context of climate change and international agreements to reduce GHG emissions, the fight against deforestation gained new interest. This paper bridges a gap between two aspects of economic policies in developing countries that are usually considered in isolation, namely natural resources depletion, i.e. deforestation, and monetary policies. Indeed, including environmental objectives in Governments' preoccupations and considering the potential impact of macroeconomic objectives on the environment can provide a way to impede the deforestation process that affected developing countries in the last decades.
In developing countries with an important forest area, deforestation revenues and seigniorage are two important resources for Governments. Consequently, we develop a theoretical model showing that Governments can trade off revenues generated by deforestation with seigniorage. The evidence illustrated by the econometric analysis, performed on a sample of developing countries, corroborates the existence of an arbitrage between deforestation revenues and seigniorage, emphasizing that the latter is an important driver of the deforestation process. To put it differently, macroeconomic policies that restrict seigniorage revenues by fighting inflation (such as, for example, IMF's recommendations for tightened monetary policies, including inflation targeting) can reduce the efficiency of environmental policies aimed at promoting sustainable forest management, because they create an incentive for Governments to increase the rate of resource exploitation for obtaining missing revenues. This idea receives support in the survey by López (2006, p.157) showing that countries under structural adjustments programs underinvested in their environmental assets.
One way to avoid deforestation in low-inflation countries is to allow for an International Agency to subsidy forest protection policies. A transfer scheme defining inflation-contingent rewards for "avoided deforestation" can be a way for implementing a form of "win-win strategy" (similar to the debt-for-nature swaps), by removing the temptation for governments to over-deplete forests. Sketching the operational design for such a mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. However, several experiences can help shedding some light on the relevance of the mechanism. For instance, Cassimon et al. (2011) identify several shortcomings among which additionality. Moreover, Barbier (2011) draws attention on the need to find new sources of funding to make REDD like mechanisms more effective. At last, recent estimations of the size of the transfer have already been released: Angelsen et al. (2009) suggest that an amount of 2 billion USD per year, gradually increasing within 5 years to 10 billion, may be appropriate to support REDD funding.
Appendix A1. The model with three instruments
We consider in this Appendix a model with an additional financing source, namely income taxes or taxes on a mineral resource ( ) τ . Consequently, the welfare function becomes ( Assume in the following that 0 ν = , to find the results in the main text, and also that the government is able to find an alternative resource to finance public spending: such a resource may come from an exceptional tax or from a direct transfer from abroad, i.e. aid, debt relief, etc. We model this additional resource, which is a substitute for transfers rewarding avoided deforestation, by ω φτ ≡ . In the following, we will show that such a resource cannot modify the tradeoff between disinflation and deforestation. The maximization of (a1) leads to unchanged first order conditions, ( 
Remark that both variables negatively depend on the additional resource ω . Adopting the same strategy as in the main text, we find the optimal value of ω which maximizes (
